The European Parliament's involvement in the EU response to the corona pandemic: a spectator in times of crisis by Ondarza, Nicolai von
www.ssoar.info
The European Parliament's involvement in the EU
response to the corona pandemic: a spectator in
times of crisis
Ondarza, Nicolai von
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ondarza, N. v. (2020). The European Parliament's involvement in the EU response to the corona pandemic: a
spectator in times of crisis. (SWP Comment, 45/2020). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches
Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2020C45
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-70448-8
 
 
 
NO. 45 OCTOBER 2020 Introduction 
The European Parliament’s Involvement in 
the EU Response to the Corona Pandemic 
A Spectator in Times of Crisis 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
Since the beginning of 2020, European Union (EU) institutions have adopted a number 
of measures in response to the corona pandemic to coordinate Member States’ con-
tainment efforts and provide European resources for joint reconstruction. The EU re-
covery fund will set the course that will shape European integration. Nevertheless, 
despite its budgetary rights, the European Parliament (EP) has remained an onlooker 
for most of these decisions, as it did during the euro and refugee crises. In order to 
strengthen democratic legitimacy and the European perspective, the EP should be 
more closely involved in the EU recovery fund in the short term, and in the long term 
be given a co-decision role in the EU’s crisis policy instruments. 
 
The position of the EP in the European 
“crisis decade” – from the euro crisis 
starting in 2010 to the refugee crisis, to 
Brexit and the rise of EU-sceptic parties – 
is marked by strong contradictions. On the 
one hand, the EP has been significantly 
strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, which 
entered into force at the end of 2009. The 
co-decision procedure, in which the EP 
is on an equal footing with the Council, has 
become the ordinary legislative procedure 
and is applied to many other policy areas. 
The EP’s budgetary powers have also been 
strengthened, including a formal right 
of veto over the EU’s Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF). Although exceptions 
remain, the EP is generally on an equal 
footing with the Council and acts with this 
self-conception. 
This strengthened role in law-making 
has also had an impact in practice. In 2008, 
for example, the EP only had a say in 
39.7 per cent of the EU directives and regu-
lations passed, whereas in 2019 it was fully 
involved in 78.8 per cent (own data collec-
tion). Although there are still (rare) excep-
tions where the EP is only consulted or 
where the Council can decide on EU legis-
lation on its own, full co-decision by the EP 
is now considered the norm. The EP has 
thus played a leading role in shaping major 
EU regulatory initiatives, such as the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation. 
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Little Involvement in Crisis 
Policy-Making 
This increased level of co-decision in EU 
legislation is, however, counterbalanced by 
the fact that intergovernmental procedures 
dominate at times of crisis in the EU. When-
ever quick responses to a crisis were nec-
essary, the EP was largely limited to a spec-
tator role. Whether the euro crisis or the 
refugee crisis, the main decisions were 
usually taken by the national heads of state 
and government in the European Council. 
During the euro crisis, for example, the 
key decisions about the programmes for 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus were 
taken in the Eurogroup and the European 
Council without the involvement of the EP. 
Thus, the first programme for Greece in 
the form of the European Financial Stabil-
isation Mechanism (EFSM) was based on 
Art. 122 (2) TFEU, according to which the 
Council alone decides; the EP is only in-
formed. The subsequent modifications of 
the Eurozone rescue instruments in the 
form of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the permanent European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) were outside the 
institutional framework of the EU. In addi-
tion, because the contributions were based 
purely on national budgets, the EP was not 
involved in the establishment of, or the 
individual decisions on, the programmes of 
the EFSF and the ESM, respectively. The EP 
has repeatedly called for more transparency 
and democratic control of the Troika in the 
pan-European interest. A notable exception 
with clear EP input was the reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2010/11. Parts 
of the “six pack” legislation could only be 
adopted by co-decision, which the EP used 
to get a full say on the whole package. 
The refugee crisis revealed a similar 
pattern. Although EU asylum and migra-
tion policy was put under co-decision by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the central political 
negotiations on how to deal with the refu-
gees took place in the European Council. 
The EP also had no influence on the con-
troversial decision about refugee reloca-
tion – its legal basis was Art. 78 (3) TFEU, 
where the EP is only consulted. The central 
foreign policy component – the “EU Turkey 
Statement” on migration – was a political 
agreement between the heads of state and 
government of the EU and Turkey, in which 
the EP was not involved in any way. The EP’s 
demands for compliance with human rights 
at the EU’s external borders have failed to 
resonate. However, the EP was involved in 
the legislation on strengthening Frontex. 
Of all the EU crises in the last decade, the 
EP was most involved in the case of Brexit. 
Formally, the controversial withdrawal 
agreement between the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the EU required the Parliament’s 
approval; the agreement on future rela-
tions, especially in the trade sector, also 
needs to be approved by the EP. But where-
as the British House of Commons became 
the site of great political drama – mainly 
because of the razor thin majority of the UK 
government, which was constantly in dan-
ger on Brexit due to disagreements on the 
right course for Brexit within the Conserva-
tive Party – the EP played a supporting 
role. In close coordination with the Euro-
pean Commission, the Parliament has 
backed EU negotiator Michel Barnier in a 
series of resolutions. Acting as a kind of 
“bad cop”, it has threatened not to accept 
the agreement if key EU demands – such 
as securing the rights of EU citizens, the 
UK’s budgetary commitments, and the open 
border with EU member Ireland – are not 
secured. However, the EP was again not 
involved in the most politically significant 
decisions, such as the definition of the EU 
mandate and the decisions on extensions of 
Article 50 negotiations. 
So even more than at the national level, 
it remains to be said that in moments of 
crisis, also in the EU the executive is in 
charge – both the Commission and the 
national governments. Partly because treaty 
changes have become taboo, the many 
instruments created during crises largely 
make use of flexibility clauses in EU treaties 
that do not provide for the involvement 
of the EP – or are set up entirely outside 
the EU framework. At the same time, the 
European Council, where crises are made 
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Chefsache (a matter for the bosses), is becoming 
even more prominent. 
The EP’s Ability to Act during 
the Pandemic 
Like at the national level, the work of the 
Parliament has been severely constrained 
by the corona pandemic. The EP was one of 
the first parliaments to react by cancelling 
its Strasbourg plenary sessions in March 
2020. Ever since then, parliamentary work 
in Brussels has also been limited. In gen-
eral, the EP is considered a “working parlia-
ment” whose functioning is based on a 
large number of plenary, committee, and 
political group meetings, all of which 
cannot take place in a customary manner 
during the pandemic. There is also the 
trans-European component – Members of 
Parliament (MEPs) and their teams usually 
travel continuously between Brussels, 
Strasbourg, and their constituencies. It is 
precisely this travel and exchange of activ-
ity that has been, and still is, hardly pos-
sible due to different national restrictions. 
These logistical challenges were met 
relatively quickly by the Parliament. For 
example, the EP first suspended its monthly 
move to Strasbourg and declared a state of 
emergency. In consequence, both plenary 
sessions and committee meetings were held 
via videoconferencing, and remote voting 
was made possible for all MEPs. Currently, 
the EP is negotiating a long-term adaptation 
of its Rules of Procedure. Despite isolated 
technical difficulties, all MEPs were thus 
able to take part in parliamentary work, 
even if they were severely restricted in their 
home countries due to lockdown measures. 
Whereas in March 2020 all committee 
meetings had to be cancelled, between April 
and July 2020, there were 140 committee 
meetings held via video with simultaneous 
interpretation; however, the planned plenary 
session in Strasbourg in September had to 
be relocated back to Brussels at short notice. 
In addition, during the pandemic-related 
restrictions, the EP has mainly worked un-
der the “urgent procedure” in accordance 
with Art. 163 of the EP Rules of Procedure. 
Legislative texts are thus passed through 
the usual stations as quickly as possible. 
Normally, informality through meetings in 
the restaurant for MEPs or discussions in 
the corridor is one of the most important 
decision-making instruments for MEPs. 
However, the pandemic has forced the 
formalisation of decision-making. Although 
the EP was able to maintain its capacity to 
act despite massive logistical constraints, 
political work has become more difficult. 
Legislation on the Fast Track 
As a result, the legislative activity of the EP 
was noticeably constrained. Most EU legis-
lation is now adopted at first reading, fol-
lowing a common position that is agreed 
by the Parliament, the Council, and the 
Commission in the so-called trialogues. This 
procedure increases the efficiency of EU 
legislation, but it is also criticised due to its 
lack of transparency. Nevertheless, the pro-
portion of EU legislation adopted at first 
reading following agreement in a trialogue 
has risen steadily in recent legislative pe-
riods. In 2019, all 203 co-decision proce-
dures were completed at first reading for 
the first time. 
At the same time, the pandemic poses 
additional challenges for the trialogue 
procedure. This is because trialogues are 
composed of a relatively large number of 
participants from three different institu-
tions. But even though the European Par-
liament, the Council, and the Commission 
each promptly established internal com-
munication channels to hold at least a 
limited number of meetings securely via 
videoconference, the technical infrastruc-
ture and/or political agreement on a 
common video format was lacking. There-
fore, no trialogue negotiations took place 
between February 2020 and the following 
parliamentary summer recess. As a result, 
in the first half of 2020, the EP took a total 
of 18 decisions in co-decision dossiers, 
down from 197 in the first half of 2019 
(although traditionally a relatively large 
number of legislative initiatives are con-
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cluded before the European elections). More-
over, due to the lack of its own right of 
initiative, the EP can only take legislative 
action if the Commission uses its right 
of proposal. 
The few legislative decisions taken by 
the EP in the first half of 2020 in the wake 
of the corona pandemic can largely be 
characterised as “confirmatory decisions”, 
in which the EP gives its stamp of approval 
to legislation driven by the Commission 
and, in some cases, national governments 
in the Council. These included measures to 
mobilise investment in Member States’ 
health systems, the reinforcement of the 
EU’s civil protection mechanism, and 
exemptions to support the agriculture and 
fisheries sectors. 
On the one hand, these decisions show 
that the EP is quite capable of using urgent 
procedures in legislation. In April 2020, 
the procedure for amending the EU budget 
to free up financial resources for civil 
protection and severely affected Member 
States took less than three weeks from the 
Commission proposal to approval by the 
Parliament and the Council; the parliamen-
tary process itself took only three days. 
Nineteen legislative procedures were com-
pleted by the EP within 23.3 days on aver-
age between March and July 2020, with an 
average MEP approval rate of 90.8 per cent 
(own calculation). Despite the higher level 
of fragmentation following the 2019 
European elections, the EP acted quickly 
and consistently. 
Scrutinising the Commission 
Parliamentary work not only takes place 
through legislative and budgetary decisions, 
but also by scrutinising the executive, in 
particular if it has to act fast during times 
of crisis. Here too, the distinct lines of 
legitimacy in the political system of the EU 
have an impact: As long as the central 
political decisions at the European level are 
taken in the European Council, parliamen-
tary control must be exercised to a large 
extent through the national parliaments. 
Although the President of the European 
Council reports to the EP plenary after each 
summit, he is not accountable to the EP. 
The Commission, on the other hand, is 
directly accountable to the EP. Here, follow-
ing the resumption of committee meetings 
by video, the Parliament has also fully 
resumed its hearing activities. According to 
the EP’s research service, between March 
and July 2020, the EP held a total of 113 
hearings in its committees on the manage-
ment of the coronavirus pandemic in the 
EU, 75 of which involved representatives 
from the Commission. Hearings on the 
management of the pandemic also included 
representatives of several EU agencies 
(such as Europol, the European Medicines 
Agency, the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control, among other), as 
well as European Central Bank (ECB) Presi-
dent Christine Lagarde, the then Eurogroup 
President Mário Centeno, or, per custom, 
the head of government of the country 
assuming the rotating Council Presidency, 
which in July 2020 was German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. In almost all committees, 
MEPs questioned the Commission about 
how the EU was dealing with the challenges 
of the pandemic. The successor to Phil 
Hogan, who resigned at the end of August 
2020, will also have to face a hearing in the 
EP before being appointed. 
During the corona pandemic, MEPs also 
made unusually strong use of parliamen-
tary questions to the European Commis-
sion. Since the beginning of the year until 
September 2020, they have asked a total of 
535 questions relating to “Covid-19”. This is 
more than all questions from the EP on 
Brexit in the last five years, and about half 
as many as on migration since 2014 (own 
data collection). At the same time, it is note-
worthy that the majority of questions came 
from the political groups supporting the 
Commission (EPP, S&D, Renew Europe) and 
not, as is usually the case, from the EU-
sceptical or oppositional groups. This under-
lines the importance of MEPs’ need for 
information on the pandemic’s impact and 
the response by the EU. 
Nevertheless, the communication func-
tion of the European Parliament remains 
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limited. Neither in the euro crisis nor the 
refugee crisis was the EP the arena for 
central European policy debates. This has 
remained largely the case, despite these 
hearings. An important exception was the 
public apology of Commission President 
Ursula von der Leyen to Italy in April 2020. 
EP Involvement in the EU 
Response to the Corona Pandemic 
As public health policy is largely the re-
sponsibility of the Member States (or even 
the leaders at the regional level), the EU’s 
main response to the challenges of the 
coronavirus pandemic has been economic. 
As an economic community, the Union has 
the most instruments in this area, and it is 
now being expressly challenged by the 
deepest recession in the post-war period, a 
recession whose effects are very asymmetric 
between Member States. 
To address these concerns, the EU has 
gradually put in place a series of economic 
measures to support Member States. A close 
look at these instruments, and the involve-
ment of the European Parliament in their 
adoption, underlines the limits of the EP’s 
power – even beyond the crisis. 
The First Economic Response – 
Cohesion Funds, SURE, ESM 
An early economic response of the EU was 
the decision in April 2020 to mobilise exist-
ing EU funds so that they could be used 
more flexibly, and partly without co-financ-
ing by the Member States (Coronavirus 
Response Investment Initiative). Given its 
budgetary powers, the EP was formally fully 
involved and agreed to the Commission’s 
proposal via the urgent procedure – and 
through remote voting. This co-decision 
role was mandatory due to the use of exist-
ing EU funds. However, this legal basis also 
had disadvantages, such as the fact that 
the criteria for allocation of the funds be-
tween the Member States were not changed, 
meaning that Central and Eastern European 
countries benefited greatly, although they 
were (at the time) relatively hardly affected 
by the coronavirus. 
Parliament’s involvement was different 
when innovative economic instruments 
were introduced. One example of this is EU 
support for short-time work allowances in 
Member States particularly affected (Support 
to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an 
Emergency – SURE). A total of €100 billion 
in loans is to support the various short-time 
work allowance schemes, which most 
Member States introduced to mitigate the 
economic consequences of their respective 
lockdowns. Such support for national 
welfare measures would have been highly 
controversial beforehand, but it passed 
unanimously within weeks due to the impact 
of the pandemic. The EP, however, was not 
involved in this decision. Similar to the 
EFSM in the euro crisis, the European Com-
mission used the flexibility of Art. 122 (2) 
TFEU. No approval by the European Parlia-
ment is necessary – it was merely informed 
of the decision. The procedure for the dis-
bursement of the loans also takes the form 
of implementing decisions by the Council 
on a proposal from the Commission, 
without EP involvement. 
In parallel with the SURE programme, 
the Eurogroup agreed in April 2020, after 
difficult negotiations, on a comprehensive 
set of instruments to help euro area Mem-
ber States deal with the economic conse-
quences of the pandemic. This includes the 
(as yet unused) possibility of borrowing 
from the ESM on significantly better terms. 
Again, the European Parliament was not 
involved – the ESM is an international 
treaty outside the EU institutions, and its 
decisions are not controlled by the EP. 
The ECB’s actions, including the Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), are 
also not under the direct control of the EP. 
No Role for the EP at the Summit 
However, the core of the response to the 
medium-term economic disruption is to be 
provided by the next MFF (2021–2027) and 
the EU recovery fund. According to the 
political agreement of the European Council 
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in July 2020, the MFF will be much larger 
than had been planned before the pandem-
ic – at €1.8 trillion, including a €750 billion 
recovery fund (Next Generation EU). This 
fund will also allow the EU to borrow larger 
sums on its own, create new own resources, 
and disburse €390 billion in grants, mainly 
to the most severely affected Member 
States. Although limited in time, this com-
bination of a substantially increased budget, 
new own resources, and direct grants to 
Member States represents a step forward in 
the integration of the Union that would 
have been unthinkable before the pandemic. 
Formally, the EP should have played an 
important role in the negotiations on the 
MFF – since the Lisbon Treaty, it is not 
only the annual budget but also the long-
term financial framework that requires 
the approval of MEPs. During the long lead-
up to the MFF negotiations, the Parliament 
therefore passed several resolutions in 
which MEPs in particular called for a higher 
EU budget with more investment spending 
at the European level, new own resources, 
and a robust rule of law mechanism. 
However, the EP was only involved to 
a very limited extent in the actual political 
negotiations from May to July 2020. The 
political initiative to combat the growing 
divergences in the EU through a recovery 
fund with grants came from Germany and 
France, in close coordination with Commis-
sion President von der Leyen; the restruc-
tured MFF was proposed by the European 
Commission; and the political wrangling 
over the relationship between grants and 
loans and the central pillars of the MFF 
took place in the European Council. At the 
crucial summit in July 2020 – where 
European Council President Charles Michel, 
the 27 heads of state and government, and 
Commission President von der Leyen spent 
five days and nights wrestling over the EU 
budget – the EP President was invited only 
to a brief formal exchange of views as a 
prelude to the summit. The central lines of 
conflict and negotiation were between 
the Member States, and the political deci-
sion was ultimately one for the heads of 
state and government. 
This negotiating mode is also reflected in 
the outcome. Although some of the key 
demands of the EP resolutions can be found 
in the substantially revamped MFF – in 
particular the increased budget and the 
prospect of new own resources – the heads 
of state and government reached agreement 
at the expense of the pan-European inter-
est. In the negotiations, cuts were made pri-
marily to overarching programmes (Euro-
pean Defence Fund, Horizon Europe, 
EU4Health, Erasmus, etc.), whereas finan-
cial transfers to the Member States and 
national rebates were maintained. The pros-
pect of new EU own resources is included, 
but it remains extremely vague, as is the 
rule of law mechanism. 
However, unlike the previous examples, 
the MFF process is not yet complete. Al-
though heads of state and government can 
negotiate the policy framework among 
themselves in the European Council, the 
necessary formal implementation requires 
an agreement with the EP. This includes 
both the formal MFF decision and the deci-
sion on the reform of EU own resources 
necessary for the recovery fund. Its formal 
veto right will give Parliament the leverage 
to try to push its own priorities for the recov-
ery fund and the MFF in autumn 2020. 
Conclusions 
Since at least 2010, the EU has been going 
through overlapping crises, which have also 
permanently altered its institutional bal-
ance. As in the euro and refugee crises, the 
EP has played only a minor role in shaping 
the EU’s political and economic responses 
to the coronavirus pandemic. This marginal 
role is partly explained by the nature of the 
challenge – health policy is not an original 
EU competence, and much of the action 
to contain the pandemic was taken at the 
national level, and at best coordinated 
between Member States within EU bodies. 
On the other hand, the classic patterns of 
European “crisis policy-making” were also 
evident in the areas in which the EU had 
competences: The European Council was the 
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central decision-making body and political 
stage, and all facets of crisis policy-making 
became Chefsache. The European Commis-
sion was given further implementing tasks, 
such as the control of programmes for 
the recovery fund. At the same time, legis-
lative work – in which the Parliament has 
full say – was reduced to a minimum. 
Even in the negotiations on the central 
course to be set for the EU budget in the 
coming years, the heads of state and govern-
ment in the European Council want to 
present the EP with a fait accompli. Mean-
while, new instruments either use flex-
ibility clauses in the EU treaty without par-
liamentary participation (like SURE) or are 
directly organised outside the EU’s legal 
framework (like the ESM). 
This marginal role cannot be justified by 
the logistical challenges for parliamentary 
work during the coronavirus pandemic. 
In a relatively short period of time, the 
European Parliament succeeded in main-
taining its own capacity to act by means of 
a combination of video conferences and 
remote voting, despite the severe restric-
tions on conducting cross-border political 
work. In the processes of adjusting the EU 
budget and adopting legislation, the EP 
proved its capability to take decisions 
within a very short time by means of the 
urgent procedure. Despite the growing 
fragmentation of the EP, the political 
groups quickly mobilised clear majorities 
for these decisions. In none of the proce-
dures with mandatory parliamentary 
involvement was the Parliament a blocking 
or even a major delay factor. 
The EU Needs Parliamentary In-
volvement Even in Times of Crisis 
The far-reaching measures launched to 
contain and combat the economic conse-
quences of the coronavirus pandemic in 
the EU also require greater parliamentary 
legitimacy at the European level. In the 
short term, the adoption of the MFF and the 
recovery fund is the central test for the EP’s 
role in the EU’s institutional balance. 
The formal right of consent of the EP 
contrasts with the practical preliminary 
decision by the European Council, in which 
the national governments weave a compro-
mise around their individual national 
interests. In doing so, they have also cut 
spending in areas that the EP has called for 
in the interests of Europe as a whole. It is 
now up to the German Council Presidency 
to negotiate a compromise between the EP 
and the Council so that the MFF, and in 
particular the financial resources of the 
recovery fund, are available on time. The 
majority political groups (EPP, S&D, Renew 
Europe, and Greens/EFA) have publicly 
stated that they will only agree to the MFF if 
improvements are made to the rule of law 
and pan-European programmes. It will also 
be important for parliamentarians to estab-
lish control over the implementation of the 
recovery fund and the associated national 
programmes. The MFF decision will also 
be the moment when the Parliament could 
commit the Commission and Member 
States in the Council to concrete details and 
a fixed timetable for envisaged new own 
resources. 
However, MEPs face a dilemma: Follow-
ing the political agreement in the European 
Council, the EP would have to accept re-
sponsibility for delays in the MFF and dis-
bursements from the recovery fund. If, on 
the other hand, the EP accepts the prelimi-
nary decision of the European Council, 
MEPs would lose their credibility and be 
carelessly giving up their participation rights. 
In the medium to long term, the EU 
should also discuss in the upcoming 
“Conference on the Future of Europe” how 
European crisis policy-making can be better 
legitimised by Parliament. After 10 years 
of crisis, it is no longer sufficient to refer to 
the unique situation of individual crises 
when crisis mode has become the normal 
state of affairs. However, two means that 
require treaty amendments could in the 
future further strengthen the involvement 
of the EP, even in times of crisis. On the one 
hand, the Parliament should be given a 
right of initiative in addition to the Euro-
pean Commission’s existing monopoly 
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on making proposals. With its own initia-
tives, the EP could thus react during – but 
of course also outside times of – crisis, 
thereby bringing in a stronger pan-Euro-
pean element to EU crisis response in 
addition to the Commission. 
On the other hand, the EU’s crisis policy 
instruments should be reformed to include 
involvement of the Parliament. As long as 
it is primarily national resources and 
competences that are affected – as is the 
case with the ESM – parliamentary control 
is the responsibility of the national par-
liaments. If EU instruments are used, how-
ever, such as with the SURE short-time 
working allowance programme and the 
EFSM, the Parliament should be given 
a right of consent in the course of the next 
treaty amendment. For this, Art. 122 TFEU 
would need to be amended to require co-
decision. 
Times of crisis will always require quick 
decision-making, which, at the national 
and European levels, is mostly the domain 
of the executive. But this quick decision-
making also needs to be scrutinised by 
Parliament, and long-term changes should 
require parliamentary approval. With so 
much crisis-driven policy-making in the EU, 
the Union should also adapt its crisis policy 
instruments with stronger EP involvement. 
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